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This paper investigates the impact of government spending on output and the size of the 
spending multiplier during periods of output contraction vs. expansion. It also investigates the 
impact of spending when the economy hits the nominal zero lower bound. It uses a panel of 
21 advanced countries over the period of 1979-2011, applying a TSLS estimation technique. 
We find a spending multiplier of close to 1 during expansion and values of up to 3 during 
contractions. However, our results do not indicate a difference in the impact of spending 
during nominal zero lower bound periods.  
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The financial crisis that began in 2007 has brought an old question of macroeconomics to 
the forefront again: What should fiscal policy do in a recession? Should it counteract swings 
in private demand, accepting higher budget deficits, or should it aim at sustainable public 
balances? The answer to these questions depends among other things on how large the fiscal 
multiplier is.  
This question already figured prominently in the debates between Keynesians and 
Monetarists in the 1960s. With the renaissance of New Classical economics in the 1970s and 
80s the role of fiscal policy became downplayed. The Ricardian equivalence theorem argued 
that anticipated fiscal expansions would be ineffective because people expect future tax 
increases (Barro, 1989a). The New Keynesian reply to this was that a part of the population 
will be credit constraint and will react to current income rather than permanent income 
(Mankiw, 2000). Empirically the majority of studies did show non-zero multipliers 
(Hemming et al 2002; Bouthevillain et al. 2009). With Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) the New 
Classical argument moved to the empirical terrain and provided a powerful new term 
‘expansionary fiscal contractions’ (EFC). 
Prior to the crisis the majority views in macroeconomics, the so-called New Consensus 
Model (Woodford 2009), assigned only a minor role to fiscal policy, which is essentially 
reduced to automatic stabilisers. However, with the deep recession following 2007, this view 
has been put into question. The IMF has highlighted that existing macro models consistently 
underestimated fiscal multipliers (Blanchard and Leigh 2013). Also, the validity of EFC has 
been questioned (Guardjardo et al 2011). Recently, several papers of Keynesian inspiration 
have argued that multipliers will be different during a crisis from those of normal times. For 
example, de Long and Summers (2012) argue that in a depressed economy “the Keynesian 
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multiplier is likely to be substantially greater than the relatively small value it is thought to 
have in normal times” (de Long and Summers 2012, 233f).   
 
There is a large empirical literature estimating fiscal multipliers econometrically. Recent 
estimation strategies fall into three broad groups. The first group utilises New Keynesian 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (NK DSGE) models. These models are theory-
guided and impose strong long-run restrictions. The second group uses VAR models that 
estimate a system of equations with an attempt to separate the innovations in fiscal shocks. 
The third group consists of panel analyses that typically impose no long term restrictions. The 
vast majority of studies estimate multipliers that are invariant with respect to the state of the 
economy. Only very recently have there been attempts to provide estimates of the multiplier 
that differ during boom and downswing. Christiano et al. (2011) do so in a NK DSGE model. 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), De Cos and Moral-Benito (2013) and Thomakos 
(2012) use a VAR approach for the USA, Spain and Greece respectively distinguishing 
between recession and non-recession periods. Afonso et al. (2010) and Turini et al. (2012) 
use a panel two stage least square (TSLS) approach for large panels of advanced and 
developing economies. 
This paper contributes to the debate by estimating fiscal multipliers for a panel of 21 
OECD countries (1979-2011) and allow the multiplier to differ in the expansion and the 
contraction of the growth cycle.
1
 We use government final consumption expenditures and 
total government expenditures as measures of fiscal activity. In variation of the basic 
specifications we also allow the multiplier to vary if the economy has hit the zero lower 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘recession’ is used widely in the relevant literature, but potentially confusing. Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) and Thomakos (2012) define as recessions the periods with a negative output gap. De 
Cos and Moral – Benito (2013) define recessionary periods based on output gap, change in unemployment rate, 
banking defaults, following Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), and periods of fiscal stress with large deficit to GDP 
ratio and debt to GDP ratio. However, recessions are sometimes defined as periods of at least two consecutive 
quarters of negative GDP growth. We will use a dataset identifying the turning points of the growth cycle. We 
prefer the term ‘downswing’ rather than recession.  
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interest bound (ZLB). We use a two stage least squares (TSLS) procedure to address the issue 
of endogeneity. We find that TSLS estimates give multipliers substantially above those of 
OLS estimates. The TSLS gives multipliers of unity for expansionary times and above 3 
during contractionary periods.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the debate on fiscal policy and 
section 3 discusses the econometric literature on fiscal multipliers. Section 4 presents the 
estimation strategy and data definitions and sources. Section 5 gives the empirical results and 
section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The debate on fiscal policy  
In traditional Keynesian theory, deficit-financed government spending was regarded as the 
main stabilization tool, at least in the short-run. The spending multiplier was considered as a 
function of the marginal propensity to consume, the marginal propensity to import and the tax 
propensities.  The estimated multipliers were high (e.g. Evans 1969). Monetarism challenged 
Keynesian theory in the 1960s and 70s. It argued that consumption expenditures would 
depend on permanent rather than current income. Furthermore, government deficits would 
increase interest rates, which crowds out private investment. Eventually, the economy would 
always return to the natural rate of unemployment and accumulate a high level of debt 
(Friedman, 1968). Consequently, fiscal multipliers were likely to be low, but non-trivial in 
the short-run. 
New Classical economics went further in its criticism of the multiplier based on the 
assumptions of rational expectations and continuous market clearing (Laidler, 1986). The 
Ricardian equivalence theorem demonstrated that government spending financed by issuing 
bonds would be ineffective because rational agents would expect future tax rise and would 
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consequently reduce their consumption and increase savings to pay out higher taxes in the 
future (Barro, 1989a). In contrast to Keynesian theory, expansionary fiscal policy would have 
contractionary rather than expansionary effects on private consumption.    
New Classical models were developed further into real business cycle (RBC) theory and 
DSGE models. RBC is a stochastic version of neoclassical theory with infinitely lived 
intertemporal optimizing agents (Barro, 1989b). Since this model is built on strict 
neoclassical assumptions, the Ricardian equivalence theorem applies. The impact of spending 
on output is less than one if tax financed, and negative or zero if deficit financed. Also, 
because of its negative wealth effect, government spending dampens private consumption.  
In response, New Keynesian theory demonstrated that rational behavior and expectations 
are consistent with market failures and price and wage rigidities, if there are transaction costs, 
market power or asymmetric information (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1987). They argued that 
the Ricardian equivalence implicitly assumed perfect capital markets. If, however, some 
individuals were finance-constrained, their consumption expenditures may respond to current 
income. New Keynesian models now typically assume the existence of a share of rational 
(‘Ricardian’) consumers as well as a share of rule-of-thumb consumers (Mankiw, 2000). 
Government spending increases income of these consumers, their consumption and 
consequently aggregate output. Thus New Keynesians reestablished a (potential) for fiscal 
policy. 
In the late 1990s and early 2000 New Keynesian price and wage rigidities were introduced 
into DSGE models and have been widely used in policy analysis. This strand of the literature 
is referred to as New Synthesis or NK-DSGE (Woodford, 2009). Inclusion of rule-of-thumb 
consumers and sticky prices in the model makes the impact of government spending positive 
and large (Gali et. al, 2007). Following a spending shock, price stickiness increases real 
wages which increases the income of rule-of-thumb consumers, who will their expenditures 
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and therefore aggregate demand. The impact of the spending shock is not long lasting 
because the model is mainly built on neoclassical foundations. Furthermore, with a central 
bank following a Taylor-rule reaction function, which is the standard assumption for policy 
analysis, the size of multiplier in these models is smaller than traditional Keynesian 
multipliers.  
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) took the argument even further and coined the term 
“expansionary fiscal contraction”. Investigating the effect of an expansion in the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance (CAPB) in Denmark and Ireland during 1980s they found a positive 
correlation with economic growth and private consumption. Therefore, they argued that a 
large and persistent reduction in government spending will have an expansionary impact on 
private consumption and ultimately GDP. This effect prevails when agents expect a further 
reduction in government spending and taxation because of a sharp reduction in government 
spending. In contrast, Guajarado et al. (2011) claim that the expansionary effect of fiscal 
consolidation is overstated. Changes in CAPB as a measure of fiscal balance leads to biased 
results in favour of expansionary fiscal contraction, because they can be an outcome of non-
policy changes and correlated with other developments such as a boom in stock market.   
The global financial crisis of 2007 brought the question of expansionary deficit spending 
back to the forefront. At the onset of the crisis, most countries embarked on a widespread use 
of fiscal stimulus. Khatiwada (2009) provides a comprehensive account of fiscal response by 
32 countries after the global financial crisis. However, in many countries, namely in Europe, 
fiscal policy adopted a much more restrictive stance. The ongoing political debates on 
austerity (Blyth, 2013) are reflected in an intense academic debate and have led to a 
restatement of Keynesian arguments.  
The key argument in this is that in a recession with high unemployment, prices may fall. 
As the interest rate is at its zero-lower bound (ZLB), this makes monetary policy ineffective 
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as the central bank loses its ability to lower interest rates further. In NK-DSGE, when 
nominal interest rates are stuck at zero, real interest rates rise, which then leads to a 
deflationary spiral. An increase in government spending counteracts the deflationary spiral 
and drives down the real interest and causes a large increase in output (Christiano et al., 
2011). Michaillat (2012) claims that fiscal policy is also more effective not only at the zero 
lower bound, but also when the labour market is depressed. The higher the unemployment in 
the private sector, the more effective is expansionary spending when financed by labour tax, 
which will then increase public employment. Turini et al. (2012) argue that the underlying 
reason for the greater impact of fiscal policy during the banking crisis is the presence of not 
only rule-of-thumb consumers, but also households whose borrowing is constrained by the 
value of their collateral. Eggertson and Krugman (2012) show that a NK-DSGE model with 
households with different rates of time preference can generate strong Keynesian features if 
finance constraints become binding. Fiscal policy alleviates these constraints and leaves a 
greater impact on output. De Long and Summers (2012) go further by positing hysteresis 
effects and thus also find positive long run effects of fiscal policy. 
There is a profound and long-standing disagreement about the size of multipliers in 
economic theory. It will depend on numerous assumptions: including the conduct of 
monetary policy, nominal and real rigidities, whether consumers are Ricardian or follow a 
rule-of-thumb approach, the size of the marginal propensity to consume and the marginal 
propensity to import and etc. In the aftermath of the 2007 crisis several contributions have 
highlighted the possibility that the multiplier may vary with economic conditions. It may be 
substantially higher in times of recessions with underutilized capacity. Substantial parts of 
modern mainstream macroeconomics assign a privileged role to monetary policy in short-
term stabilization. In this context, New Keynesians emphasized that once inflation rates get 
close to zero (the famous ZLB) the ability of monetary policy to set the interest rate is 
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limited.  According to this view one would expect periods where the ZLB is binding to be the 
one where the multiplier takes different values.  
 
3. A review of recent empirical studies 
There is a large literature exploring the multiplier effect of spending on output 
econometrically. It can broadly be grouped into studies using a vector autoregression (VAR), 
NK-DSGE models and single equation estimation techniques (OLS, GMM and TSLS 
estimations). The VAR approach is an empirically driven systems approach, typically 
estimating up to five equations. Some of them also impose long-run restrictions. NK-DSGE 
models are large theory-guided models that impose many theoretically motivated restrictions. 
Usually these involve various forms of rational behaviour and monetary policy following a 
Taylor rule. Single equation estimations are the simplest that either use independent proxies 
for government expenditures (such as military spending) or use two-stage procedures or 
GMM to counter endogeneity. Recently, panel data have been used extensively within this 
approach. The overwhelming majority of studies in all three approaches implicitly assume a 
linear multiplier effect and only in the last few years has there been systematic research on 
nonlinear effects of government spending. Table 1 gives a summary of key papers in this 
literature. Gechert and Will (2012), Hebous (2011) and Spilimbergo et al (2009) provide 
more comprehensive reviews. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The VAR technique involves estimating a system of equations with an attempt to separate 
the innovations in government spending shocks and the response of GDP and other 
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concerned variables. The precise magnitude of the multiplier hinges on the approach to 
identification of fiscal shocks and the sample under study. Caldara and Kamps (2008) provide 
a comprehensive technical discussion and comparison of different approaches. In structural 
VAR (SVAR) and Recursive VAR (RVAR), a multiplier larger than unity has been reported 
for the US (see for example, Blanchard and Perotti 2002; Gali et al. 2007; Fatas and Mihov 
2001). However, Perotti (2005) claims that a multiplier greater than unity can only be found 
in pre-1980s in the US, and it is smaller than multipliers found in four other OECD countries 
during 1960-2001. Burriel et al. (2010) argue that multipliers are smaller than one in the US 
and EMU countries. However, they also show that the size of multipliers changes 
considerably once they control for the financial stress and government debt-to-GDP ratio.  
For a sample of 44 countries, Ilzetzki et al. (2013) argue that the spending multiplier for 
government consumption is less than one and it is larger than unity for government 
investment. They also claim that the impact of spending shocks diminishes with high levels 
of debt, flexible exchange rate regimes, and greater openness. However, Gechert and 
Mentges (2013) show that the omission of financial variables can create a substantive 
downward bias in the estimation of spending multipliers. All the aforementioned VAR 
studies consistently report a positive response of private consumption, following a 
government spending shock. Therefore, there is clear evidence of new Keynesian rule-of-
thumb consumers and Keynesian multipliers, at least in case of the US. 
Other VAR studies show a small and short-lived positive or negative response of output 
and private consumption following spending shocks. For example, Mountford and Uhlig 
(2005) with a sign restriction approach (MH-VAR) indicate a short-term spending multiplier 
of 0.65 and -0.97 at the end of the period for the US and do not show a significant movement 
of private consumption. Ramey and Shapiro (1999) in an event study approach (EV-VAR) 
claim that private consumption responds negatively even though output increases for three 
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quarters in the US. Their results support RBC theory and Ricardian equivalence, but in a 
similar approach, Burnside et al. (2004) find a small movement in private consumption and a 
short-lived rise in private investment.  
Compared to VAR studies, calibrated NK-DSGE model-based studies impose more 
theoretically motivated restrictions on the system. These restrictions are in the form of a 
monetary policy following a Taylor rule and the inclusion of Ricardian consumers. Forni et 
al. (2009) utilize a NK – DSGE model for Euro Area for the period 1980-2005 and report that 
public expenditures have a mild Keynesian effect on output. Their findings reveal that the 
biggest impact comes from the transfer to households, accounting for a one-to-one increase in 
disposable income of non- Ricardian consumers. Similarly, Afonso and Ricardo (2012) also 
use a calibrated NK – DSGE model for the US, the UK, Germany and Italy for the period of 
1964 to 2007 and they show a small impact on output following a fiscal shock.  
Ratto et al. (2009), also using a calibrated NK–DSGE model, study the impact of spending 
shocks on output in the Euro Area for the period of 1981 to 2006. They find that government 
consumption shocks crowd-out private investment and private consumption of Ricardian 
consumers, but crowd-in private consumption of non-Ricardian consumers. However, 
because of a lump-sum increase in taxes, liquidity constrained consumers also cut back their 
consumption in the medium-term. Overall, the aggregate private consumption response was 
found to be negative. In terms of multipliers, a 1 per cent increase in spending increases GDP 
by 0.73 in the first quarter falling to 0.45 in the fourth quarter. Overall, NK-DSGE models 
typically yield a small or negative impact of public spending on output due to the assumption 
of Ricardian households and monetary policy following a Taylor–rule. 
Other studies of spending multipliers use a single-equation estimation approach. Compared 
to the VAR approach, these studies do not involve estimating a system of equations and, 
compared to NK-DSGE approach, they do not impose theoretical restrictions. To overcome 
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the endogeneity of fiscal spending, they use different approaches. For instance, in order to 
study the impact of spending in 15 EU member countries, Afonso and Fuceri (2010) use a 
cross-sectional time-series OLS regression using a five-year period, from 1970-2004. They 
find that governments’ transfers, consumption and investment have a negative and 
statistically significant effect on growth. Afonso and Alegre (2011) estimate an endogenous 
growth model with a GMM estimator for 15 EU member countries during 1971-2006. They 
find a positive impact of government investment and budget deficit and negative impact of 
government consumption. On the other hand, for Italy, Acconcia et al. (2011) reports 
spending multiplier of 1.2-1.4 for the period of 1990-1999 using TSLS estimation. For the 
government spending they use a proxy, that is the large cuts in government investment 
enforced by law due to infiltration of mafia in a local city council. It is can be observed that 
the results of these studies are mixed and depend on assumption of endogeneity of fiscal 
spending.  
In a meta-regression analysis, Gechert and Will (2012) conclude that size of multipliers 
depends on econometrics techniques. Assessing 89 papers with varying approaches, they 
show that among NK-DSGE, VAR, and Single equation the latter gives the largest 
multipliers.  
The studies discussed so far implicitly assume a linear multiplier. There are only a few 
studies that allow for different effects according to economic circumstances (Parker, 2011), 
for instance, investigates nonlinearity during periods of normal times vs. financial crisis, 
recession or ZLB. Most of these studies are very recent and have not been published in peer 
refereed journals yet. Again, the literature falls into several groups. Within the VAR approach 
the nonlinearity of government spending has been studied using regime switching VAR 
(RSVAR) models. In these models, consistent with Keynesian theory, the government 
spending multiplier has been reported to be larger during recessions compared to normal 
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times. For instance, for a panel of OECD countries for the period of 1985-2010, Auerbach 
and Gorodnichenko (2012) claim that the spending multiplier is larger during recession 
(periods where output gap is negative) vs. normal times. For the sample of the US, they 
report a multiplier of 2.3 during recession and almost near zero during normal times. De Cos 
and Moral-Benito (2013) studying Spain for the period of 1986 – 2012 finds a spending 
multiplier of 1.4 during recession and 0.6 during tranquil periods. Similarly, for Greece for 
the period of 2000-2012, Thomakos (2012) reports a spending multiplier of 1.32 during 
recessions and zero during normal times 
The literature on investigating the nonlinearity of government spending in calibrated NK-
DSGE models is limited. However, Christiano et al. (2011) have provided an important 
contribution. Analyzing the impact of government spending, they claim that if monetary 
policy follows a Taylor-rule, the spending multiplier is less than one. However, if nominal 
interest rate stays constant at the binding zero-bound, the multiplier is 1.6 on impact with a 
peak value of 2.3.  
Recent studies have also used panel estimation to investigate nonlinearity of government 
spending, the imapct of spending during normal times vs. during a crisis. To overcome 
endogeneity, these investigations have employed TSLS estimations. However, these studies 
rely on very large samples of countries and when restricted to OECD countries they fail to 
find statistically significant results. Turini et al. (2012) in a study of 56 countries find that 
fiscal policy is more effective during banking crises than in normal times., They use two 
instrumental variables for government expenditures: an election variable referring to political 
budget cycle (Brender and Drazen, 2004) and lagged value of cyclically adjusted primary 
balance. For banking crises, they use the starting year of the crisis from Laeven and Valencia 
(2008) and complement it with Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and other studies. Their results 
indicate a multiplier of 0.8 during a crisis compared to 0.2 during normal times for the whole 
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sample, but when restricting TSLS estimation to EU and OECD countries, the results become 
insignificant. The validity of instruments is not reported.    
Afonso et al. (2010) find that political budget cycle and lagged budget balance ratios are 
not statistically valid instruments for government spending in OECD countries. They study 
the difference between spending multipliers of crisis and normal times for a panel of 98 
countries for the period 1981-2007. They also use the Laeven and Valencia (2008) dataset of 
financial crisis with one year and two year definition of crisis and use the lagged budget 
balance ratio and distance-to-election variable as instruments for government spending 
growth
2
. Spending multipliers are larger in recession compared to normal times, but the 
difference is statistically insignificant. The reported regular spending multiplier ranges from 
0.6 to 1.1. Moreover, when disaggregating the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries, 
their investigation could not find a strong instrument for government spending for OECD 
countries. Therefore, their results for OECD countries remained inconclusive.  
The impact of government spending and the size of spending multipliers surveyed in the 
literature vary with sample, econometric methodology, identification of fiscal shocks, 
assumption regarding the type of households and state of the economy. In general, all VAR 
studies show a positive response of output following a government spending shock. However, 
only SVAR and RVAR, in line with Keynesian theory, show a positive response of private 
consumption. In calibrated NK-DSGE models, the size of spending multiplier is smaller than 
one due to the assumption of monetary policy following a Taylor-rule and Ricardian 
equivalence. The results from single equation estimation approach remains mixed. As far as 
nonlinearity, most of the empirical works show larger multipliers during recessions compared 
to normal times. However, the size of multiplier still varies with econometric methodology, 
                                                 
2
 Afonso et al (2010) motivated by political budget cycle (Brender and Drazen, 2004) construct a variable 
measuring the distance between current and the next year of election, called distance to election variable and use 
as an instrument for government spending growth.   
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with multipliers more than unity only reported by SVAR technique. Recent studies use TSLS 
estimation and use election periods and lagged budget balance ratio as instrumental variables 
for government spending. These studies do not find significant results for OECD countries 
and instrumental variables are shown not to be statistically valid.  
 
4. Empirical Methodology and Data 
To assess the impact of government spending on output, we estimate the following 
regression equation: 
                                                                  
               (1) 
In equation (1), subscript i denotes the country (i=1..n) and t denotes the period (t=1...T). C 
is a common or individual intercept depending on specifications.      refers to real GDP 
growth rate.        -  is a vector of other explanatory variables, that will include population 
growth, catching up term, inflation, export shock, and trade.         is a dummy variable that 
captures output contraction in period t for country i.                   gauges the impact of 
spending growth during contraction and             -        estimates the impact of 
spending growth during expansion.      is the error term and it is assumed to be independent 
across countries. We also investigate nonlinearity of government spending for periods of 
nominal zero lower bound (ZLB) by replacing         with       . (discussed below) Our 
expectation is that the coefficient for the interaction term capturing spending during 
contractionary period will be larger than that for spending in periods of expansion. 
Reverse causation of Spend is a well-known potential problem. To overcome endogeneity 
we use TSLS estimation. Previous TSLS studies have used election variables and the lagged 
budget balance ratio as instrument for government spending (see for example, Turini et al. 
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(2012) and Afonso et al. (2010). However, Afonso et al. (2010) report that these are not 
statistically valid instruments for government spending for OECD countries. This is also the 
case in our sample.
3
 Therefore, we use one year lagged spending as an instrument for 
spending itself.
4
 For the modelling of interactions, we follow Balli and Sorensen (2013). At 
the first stage, we estimate the auxiliary equation for government spending growth and obtain 
the fitted values. At the second stage, we interact the fitted values with the contraction 
dummy variable.  
Following the literature we will use pooled TSLS and fixed effects (FE) TSLS estimators. 
An alternative to this would be the GMM panel estimator (e.g. Arellano and Bond 1991). 
These estimators are recommended for panels with small T and large N. This is because as T 
increases the dynamic panel bias becomes insignificant. In addition, as T increases the 
number of GMM instruments rapidly proliferates. In our case T=32 and N=21. Thus we 
prefer the TSLS estimators. The FE estimator with lagged dependent variable will be biased 
and the bias is of order 1/T (see for example, Nickell, 1981). The bias arises because the 
lagged dependent variable can be correlated with error term. In our sample the bias is likely 
to be small. Kiviet (1995) reports Monte Carlo results suggesting that with long T and small 
N, the bias is moderate; Roodman (2006) reports a bias of 20% at T=30. The pooled TSLS 
estimator does not suffer from bias. We will thus routinely report both the FE TSLS and the 
pooled TSLS estimators. Each regression will be estimated with heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) robust standard errors (Croux et al., 2003). 
                                                 
3
 Our data source differs from Afonso et al. (2010). We use mainly AMECO while Afonso et al. (2010) use 
the IMF Outlook database. 
4
 We also tried to instrument government spending with budget balance ratio and election period as 




This study covers an unbalanced panel of 21 OECD countries over the period 1979-2011 
using annual data.
5
 The source and definition of data is listed in Appendix A1. The 
Contraction dummy (Cont) is obtained from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s website. It 
is based on the OECD composite leading indicators, defining periods of output contraction 
from the midpoint of the period of the peak and ending at the midpoint of the period of 
trough. Periods of output contraction is given value 1 and 0 otherwise. To investigate whether 
the multiplier changes when inflation or interest rates get close to zero rather than when the 
economy is in a downswing, we create several dummy variables based on inflation rate and 
short-term nominal interest rate obtained from AMECO. ZLB1 and ZLB2 are dummy 
variables that take the value of 1 in periods when the inflation rate is less than 2% and 1% 
respectively. ZLB3 refer to periods when the nominal interest rate is less than 1%. Data on 
real GDP Growth rate (GDP) is taken from AMECO Database. Real government spending 
growth is also taken from AMECO database. We use two definitions of government 
spending; a narrower definition is government final consumption spending (GFC), which is 
spending on goods and services. The broader definition that is commonly found in the 
literature is total government spending (GTE), it is GFC plus government investment 
expenditure. 
As control variables we use those suggested by growth theory and by the recent literature if 
they are statistically significant: Population growth rate (POP) taken from OECD database 
and catching up term (CAT) that is a country’s GDP vis-a-vis US GDP taken from Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s website. We also control for inflation (INF), short term real 
interest rate (R) and export shock (Xshock) taken from AMECO. Gechert and Mentges 
(2013) have demonstrated that omission of financial variables will cause downward bias in 
                                                 
5
 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 




estimation of spending multipliers, therefore we also control for domestic credit to private 
sector as ratio of GDP (DCP) taken from the World Bank database.  
In the sample of 21 countries in this study, there are 293 observations for contractionary 
periods and 362 observations for expansionary times. On average, GDP grows 2.2% for the 
whole sample. However, during contraction phase of the business cycle GDP growth is 
1.38% compared to 2.9% during expansionary times. In the sample, GFC as share of GDP is 
21.15% and GTE as share of GDP is 24.45%. GFC growth rate on average is 2.1%, but 
during contraction it moves countercyclically to GDP growth and grows 2.2% vs. 2% during 
expansionary times. Similarly, GTE growth rate is 1.95% and it grows at 2% during 
contractionary periods compared to 1.9% during expansion.     
 
5. Results 
Table 2 reports the results for equation (1), considering GFC growth for government 
spending. Specifications 1 and 2 are pooled TSLS estimation, others are FE TSLS, FE and 
pooled OLS respectively. In specification (1) we only control for lagged value of GDP 
growth rate, population growth, and catching- up term., All other variables except for the 
catching–up term and GFC interaction with expansionary dummy are statistically significant 
at least at the 5% level or below. Periods of output contraction are highly significant and 
reduce GDP growth by 2.4% percentage points. Government spending during contractionary 
periods is also highly significant and positively affect GDP growth. On the other hand, 
government spending during expansionary periods is statistically insignificant and smaller 
than contractionary periods spending. Our coefficient estimate is an elasticity. To get the size 
of spending multiplier, we multiply the coefficient of interaction terms with inverse ratio of 
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government spending over GDP.
6
 In the sample of 21 OECD countries under study, GFC as 
ratio of GDP is 21.15%, therefore the estimated multiplier for contractionary and 
expansionary periods in specification 1 are 2.48 and 0.95 respectively.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Specification 2 includes additional control variables. Controlling for inflation, export 
shock, short-term real interest rate and domestic credit to private sector, the size of 
coefficients for both contractionary and expansionary periods increases, but spending during 
periods of output expansion still remains statistically insignificant. Gechert and Mentges 
(2013) show that omission of financial variable leads to downward bias in estimation of 
spending multipliers, therefore with inclusion of DCP, specification 2 is our preferred 
estimation. Spending multipliers in this specification are 3.07 and 1.01 for contractionary and 
expansionary times respectively. We get even larger multipliers with the fixed effects TSLS 
in specification 3. The Hausman test for common group intercepts suggests that FE TSLS is 
preferred to pooled TLS, however in FE TSLS the instrument for GFC is weak with first 
stage F-statistics of 8.7. Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest a first stage F-statistics of at least 
10 as a rule of thumb for validity of the instrument. For comparability, we also report 
estimations for FE and pooled OLS without controlling endogeneity of GFC in specification 
4 and 5 respectively. With respect to statistical significance, the results are similar, but the 
size of multiplier is substantially lower. Nonetheless, the multipliers for contractionary times 
still remain above 1.   
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In terms of multipliers, our results gives strong support to the Keynesian view that 
spending multipliers are larger during downswings compared to periods of economic 
expansion. With regards to magnitude of multiplier, the contractionary periods’ multipliers 
are close to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) findings for recessionary periods and 
Christiano et al. (2011) findings for ZLB. In contrast to Afonso et al. (2010), we find 
statistically valid instruments for the sample of OECD countries in our study. However, 
aforementioned studies consider a broader definition of government spending; therefore for 
the sake of robustness we also report the results for GTE as government spending variable in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The results for GTE in Table 3 are qualitatively similar to those for GFC. Specification 1 
reports the results for pooled TSLS estimation. The estimated multiplier is 1.97 and 
statistically significant for contractionary period vs. 0.48 and statistically insignificant for 
expansionary times. We get a slightly smaller multiplier for contractionary times (1.85) with 
FE TSLS estimation in specification 2 compared to 1 and larger multiplier for expansionary 
times. However, the instrument for GTE becomes weak. Nonetheless, comparing these 
results with pooled OLS and FE estimations in specification 3 and 4 we can observe that 
contractionary period multipliers are substantially smaller than TSLS estimation and 
expansionary times’ spending becomes statistically significant. Overall, although the measure 
of government spending affects the magnitude of the multiplier, they are still well above 
unity for contractionary times.  
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Building on New Consensus Macroeconomics New Keynesians have recently highlighted 
that the ability of central banks to stabilise the economy is severely impaired once the 
economy hits the ZLB, i.e. when inflation gets close to zero and interest rates are low. This 
argument would suggest that government spending multipliers will be larger at ZLB 
compared to normal times. Table 4 thus also presents results for several versions of ZLB. 
Specifications 1 and 2 investigate spending nonlinearity for the periods where inflation rate is 
less than 1% and 2% respectively and Specification 3 investigates the same for the periods 
where the nominal short-term interest rate falls below 1%. In these specifications the relevant 
coefficients are not statistically insignificant for the impact of ZLB on GDP growth. Except 
for specification 2 there is little evidence that multipliers would be higher in ZLB periods.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
6. Conclusion 
The size of the multiplier is crucial for formulation of fiscal policy. Several recent 
contributions have highlighted that multipliers may differ during booms and downswings. 
This paper has estimated government spending multipliers that differ in the upswing 
(expansion) and downswing (contraction) period of the business cycle. The model was 
estimated in panel for 21 OECD countries for the period 1979-2011, controlling for standard 
growth theory variables such as a catching up term, population growth, export shocks, and 
inflation as well as for the degree of private sector debt and the short-term real interest rate. 
The results are to be interpreted as short-run multipliers. We find that the size of multiplier 
does indeed differ substantially in the different phases of the business cycles. While 
multipliers are close to one in the upswing, they are substantially higher, around 3 in the 
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downswing. Our results also indicate that results are not driven by episodes where monetary 
policy being constrained by the zero lower inflation bound (as for example argued by De 
Long and Summers 2012). Overall our results suggest that fiscal policy is a potent tool for 
countercyclical economic policies.  
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Table 1 Summary of Empirical Literature Investigating the Impact of Government Spending on Output 





1 Blanchard and Perotti (2002) SVAR Linearity QD, USA, 1960 – 1997 Spending Multiplier = 0.9 to 1.29 
2 Fatah and Mihov (2001)  RVAR Linearity QD, USA,  1960 – 1996 Spending Multiplier= 0.7-1.74 
3 Perotti (2005)  SVAR Linearity QD, USA, West Germany, the UK, 
Canada and Australia, 1960-2001 
Spending Mutiplier = 1.29 – 1.4 for the US in pre-1980s.  
Spending Multiplier = 0.36-0.28 for the US in post-1980s 
4 Gali et. al. (2007) SVAR Linearity QD, USA, 1948 to 2003  Spending Multiplier = 0.78 to 1.74  
5 Burriel et al. (2010) SVAR Linearity QD,  EMU, US,1981-2007  Spending Multiplier =0.87-0.85 for EMU  
6 Ramey and Shapiro (1999) EVAR Linearity QD, USA, 1947-1996 Negative response of private consumption to government 
spending shock, but they showed that output rises for three 
quarters 
7 Burnside et al (2004) EVAR Linearity QD, US, 1947-1995 Output rises and there is small movement in private 
consumption and investment 
8 Ilzetzki et al. (2013) RVAR Linearity QD, 44 Countries, 1960-2007 Government consumption multiplier =0.66 for high income 
countries and -0.63 for low income countries. Government 
Investment multiplier = 1.5 for high income and 1.6 for low 
income countries. Multipliers depend on crucial 
charactersitics of economies. 
9 Mountford and Uhlig (2008) MH – VAR Linearity QD, US, 1955-2000 Spending Multiplier = 0.65 to -0.97 
Government spending shock increases output, but the 
response of private consumption is small and only 
significantly different from zero on impact 
10 Forni et al. (2009)  NK – DSGE Linearity QD, EA, 1980-2005 The biggest impact of government spending component 
was shown from transfer to households, accounting for one 
to one increase in disposable income of non- Ricardian 
consumers. 
11 Afonso and Ricardo (2012)  NK – DSGE Linearity QD, USA, UK, Germany, Italy, 1964 
to 2007 
Government spending have insignificant impact on private 
consumption and crowds - out private investment. 
12 Ratto et al. (2009)  NK – DSGE Linearity QD, EA, 1981-2006. Spending Multiplier = 0.73 to 0.45  
13 Afonso and Fuceri (2010)  CCOLS Linearity AD, 15 EU and remaining OECD, 
1970 -2004 
Government spending having detrimental effecton growth 
14 Afonso and Alegre (2011)  GMM Linearity AD< 15 EU, 1971-2006 Negative impact of government consumption, but positive 
impact of government investment and budget deficit. 
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15 Acconcia et al. (2011)  PLTSL Linearity AD, Italy, 1990-1999 Spending multiplier = 1.2-1.4  
16 Christiano et al. (2011) CNK-DSGE Nonlinearity QD, US, 2000-2010 Spending Multiplier =1.6-2.3 when zero-bound binding and 
less than unity when nominal interest rate follows Taylor 
rule 
17 Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 
(2012) 
RSVAR Nonlinearity QD, OECD,1985-2010 Spending Multiplier = 2.3 in recession and almost 0 in 
normal times (for the USA) 
18 De Cos and Moral-Benito (2013) RSVAR Nonlinearity QD, Spain, 1986 – 2012 Spending multiplier = 1.4 in recession and 0.6 in normal 
times 
19 Thomakos (2012)  RSVAR Nonlinearity QD, Greece, 2000-2012 Spending mutiplier = 1.32 during recession and near zero in 
normal times. 
20 Turini et al (2012)  PLTSL Nonlinearity AD, 56 Countries, 1970-2008  Spending Multiplier = 0.8 during crisis and 0.2 during 
normal times 
21 Afonso et al. (2010)  PLTSL Nonlinearity AD,  98 Countries,1981-2007 Regular Spending multiplier = 0.6  to 1.1. Multipliers 
during recession and normal times not statistically different 
from each other 
Note: The papers from 1 to 15, do not investigate the non-linearity in government spending. From 16 to 21, the papers investigate the multiplier during normal times 
and crisis. Details of abbreviations used are as following: 
SVAR = Structural VAR, RVAR=Recursive VAR, MH VAR = The Mountford and Uhlig VAR, EVAR=Event Study VAR, NK-DSGE= New Keynesian Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium Model Caliberated, RSVAR=Regime Switching SVAR CCOLS=Cross-country OLS, PLTSL=Panel Two-Stage Least Square, 




Table 2. GDP Growth Rate as Dependent Variable, GFC Interacted with Contraction 













 0.018***  0.027*** 0.014  0.023** 0.028*** 
(0.003)  (0.005) (0.015) (0.011) (0.004) 
GDP(-1) 
 0.398***  0.353*** 0.267*** 0.403*** 0.476*** 
(0.092)  (0.105)  (0.082)  (0.052) (0.055) 
Pop(-1) 
-0.588*** -0.24 -0.881*** -0.600*** -0.086 
(0.002)  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Cat(-1) 0.180 0.590*** 11.200 14.1*** 0.689*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.080) (0.043) (0.003) 
XShock(-1) 
 0.38 0.974 0.38 0.445 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) 
Inf 
 -0.07*** -0.083*** -0.100*** -0.067*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DCP(-1) 
 -0.01*** -0.012*** -0.015** -0.01*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R(-1) 
 -0.07** -0.097*** -0.112*** -0.073** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cont 
-0.024*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
(0.004)  (0.004)   (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002) 
GFC*Cont 
0.533** 0.661*** 0.682*** 0.219*** 0.227*** 
(0.243) (0.250) (0.217) (0.045) (0.034) 
GFC*(1-Cont) 
0.204 0.218 0.332 -0.007 0.02 
(0.165) (0.192) (0.227) (0.052) (0.051) 
N 591 550 550.00 550 550 
Adj. R
2
 0.371 0.391 0.38 0.477 0.452 
First Stage F-
Statistics 
31.3 28.6 8.7   
Test Statistics for 
Common Group 
Intercept 
  1.90**   
Contraction 
Multiplier 
2.48 3.07 3.17 1.02 1.06 
Expansion 
Multiplier 
0.95 1.01 1.54 -0.03 0.09 
Note: ***, **, and * denotes less than 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance respectively. 





Table 3. GDP Growth Rate as Dependent Variable, GTE Interacted with Contraction 
Dummy-  21 Cross Sections 








Const 0.028*** 0.021 0.025** 0.027*** 
(0.005) (0.015) (0.012) (0.004) 
GDP(-1) 0.361*** 0.281*** 0.357*** 0.437*** 
(0.094) (0.082) (0.047) (0.052) 
POP (-1) -0.134 -0.972*** -0.76*** -0.055 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cat(-1) 0.526* 10.850 12.419*** 0.627** 
(0.003) (0.077) (0.038) (0.003) 
Xshock(-1) 0.335 0.567 0.153 0.372 
(0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.003) 
Inf -0.051** -0.050* -0.061*** -0.057*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DCP(-1) -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.009*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
R(-1) 
-0.067** -0.097*** -0.104*** -0.069** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cont -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
GTE*Cont 0.477*** 0.448*** 0.199*** 0.198*** 
(0.146) (0.145) (0.054) (0.043) 
GTE*(1-Cont) 0.117 0.172 0.088*** 0.094*** 
(0.153) (0.181) (0.033) (0.029) 
N 506 506 513 513 
Adj. R
2
 0.416 0.431 0.480 0.454 
First Stage F-Statistics 28.681 7.780   
Common Group Intercept  2.1*** 2.281***  
Recession Multiplier 1.975 1.855 0.824 0.820 
Normal Times Multiplier 0.485 0.712 0.364 0.389 
Note: ***, **, and * denotes less than 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance respectively. 





Table 4. Estimations for Interaction of Government Spending with Nominal Lower 
Zero Bound 
Pooled TSLS Estimation for GFC: GDP Growth Rate as Dependent Variable - 21 
Cross Sections 
(1) (2) (3) 
ZLB1 = Inflation<=2% ZLB2 = Inflation <=1% ZLB3=Nom Interest 
Rate<=1% 
ZLB1 -0.014 ZLB2 -0.013 ZLB3 -0.0013 
(7.575) (0.010) (0.008) 
GFC*ZLB1 0.000002 GFC*ZLB2 0.491 GFC*ZLB3 -0.288 
(0.000) (0.581) (0.630) 
GFC*(1-ZLB1) -0.000001 GFC*(1-ZLB2) 0.269 GFC*(1-ZLB3) 0.423*** 
(0.000) (0.177) (0.149) 
Pooled TSLS Estimation for GTE: GDP Growth Rate as Dependent Variable - 21 
Cross Sections 
ZLB1 0.465041 ZLB2 -0.004 ZLB3 0.081 
(0.031) (-0.017) (0.153) 
GTE*ZLB1 -0.00002 GTE*ZLB2 0.0000003 GTE*ZLB3 -0.000003 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GTE*(1-ZLB1) 0.0001 GTE*(1-ZLB2) 0.000002 GTE*(1-ZLB3) 0.000003 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Note: ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at less than 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Other control variables not reported are constant term, lagged GDP, lagged 
POP, lagged CAT, lagged INF, and lagged Xshock, lagged DCP and lagged R. Standard 





Appendix A1. Data sources and definitions 
No.  Variable  Definition  Source  
1 GDP  Real GDP Growth Rate  AMECO  
2 GFC  Real  Final Consumption Expenditure of 
General Government, Growth Rate  
AMECO  
3 GTE  Total Government Expenditure= GFC+ 
Government Investment Expenditure  
AMECO  
3 Cont  An interpretation of OECD CLI defining 
periods of contraction from the Period 
following the Peak through the Trough  
 
Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis  
4 POP  Population Growth Rate  OECD  
5 CAT  Catching UP term, PPP GDP of respective 
country vis-à-vis US GDP  
Federal Reserve 
of St. Louis  
6 INF  CPI, Inflation Rate %  AMECO  
7 Xshock  Real Exports Divided by Real Imports  AMECO  
8 DCP  Domestic Credit to Private Sector as Ratio of 
GDP  
World Bank  
9 NR Short term Nominal Interest Rate AMECO  
10 ZLB1  If inflation <= 2%    





If nominal interest rate <= 1%  
Short-term Real Interest Rate 
  
AMECO 
 
 
 
 
 
